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WordPress 7.1.5 Security Release

WordPress 7.1.5 landed on 18 November 2026. It is a security release with twenty fixes, eighteen of which we have added to the Patchstack database as vulnerabil

PublishedNovember 18, 2026
Dave Jong avatar
Dave Jong
Security Research Lead at Patchstack

WordPress 7.1.5 landed on 18 November 2026. It is a security release with twenty fixes, eighteen of which we have added to the Patchstack database as vulnerabilities; the remaining two are hardening changes with no exploitable path.

Three weeks ago, 7.1.4 fixed seventeen issues, including an unauthenticated core-update race condition (CVE-2026-119977). This one is larger, and not all of it sits in the PHP tree. Five of the fixes come from a Gutenberg package bump rather than the core PHP backport, so they live in JavaScript that the official file list does not mention.

Two issues start with an unauthenticated visitor and end up in an administrator’s browser, and WordPress says one of those can end in remote code execution. Update as soon as you can.

Vulnerability PatchedRequirementsReported By
Privilege escalation via Template Part block attributes, which can lead to RCENothing (Unauthenticated), and an editor user opens the contentLogan Homolka
Multisite privilege escalation to Super Admin via Customizer menu previewsA site Administrator account, on multisiteYuval Miller
SQL injection in WP_Meta_Query via nested relation valuesNothing (Unauthenticated), via a caller that passes request data into meta_queryChristiaan Swiers
SQL injection via the front page setting in Customizer changeset previewsAn administratorRudy Faile, WordPress Security Team
Denial of service via batched XML-RPC pingbacksNothing (Unauthenticated)Giovanni Cintolo
Stored XSS via shortcode attributes in commentsNothing (Unauthenticated), and a page with a Latest Comments blockRafie Muhammad, Awesome Motive
Reflected XSS in the legacy media library popupNothing, and a victim who can upload files clicks the linkAnthropic
XSS via Openverse image metadata in the block editorNothing, and an editor user inserts the attacker’s imageShu Takahashi, Velcore Consulting
XSS in wp_interactivity_data_wp_context() via the store namespaceA plugin or theme that passes untrusted input as the namespaceJuliette Reinders Folmer
Stored XSS via scripts in oEmbed provider responsesA Contributor+ accountvvh1te3zz
Stored XSS in the Comment Date block via its date formatA Contributor+ accountWeston Ruter and Jeremy Felt, WordPress Security Team
Stored XSS via media filenames when converting a media block to a File blockA Contributor+ accountCryptoFox
Stored XSS via Customizer previewsAn administratorWeston Ruter, WordPress Security Team
Authorization bypass via comment editing in the adminAn Author+ accountJesse McNeil
Private taxonomy terms exposed via the REST API search endpointNothing (Unauthenticated)Anthropic
User email addresses exposed via the REST API comments endpointAn Author+ accountBen Bidner, WordPress Security Team
Disclosure via post and template author assignment in the REST APIAn Editor+ accountJarda Snajdr, WordPress Security Team
Disclosure of commenter emails and IPs via XML-RPC wp.getCommentsA Subscriber+ accountJaewook Lee (grze0)
Malformed regular expression broadening JSON media type matching (hardening)None statedMo Jangda, WordPress Security Team
Removal of the block editor’s Imgur embed variation (hardening)None statedZhengyu Liu, Jingcheng Yang, Gavin Zhong

What the Code Shows

Template Part Block Attributes

A template part is identified in the block editor by an entity key of the form theme//slug, taken straight from the block’s own attributes. The core-data store built REST paths by string concatenation, `${baseURL}/${recordId}`, with no check on what that key contained. A key carrying dot segments, an encoded slash, or a ? or # therefore does not address a template part at all: it addresses whatever endpoint the attacker chose, and the editor sends the request with the logged-in user’s cookies and nonce. 7.1.5 adds isSafeEntityKey() and applies it in getEntityRecord, saveEntityRecord, deleteEntityRecord, canUser and the revision and autosave resolvers.

The release note says this can lead to remote code execution. The diff on its own shows REST path injection. The step from there to code execution is the administrator’s own plugin-installation endpoints, reached with the administrator’s own credentials. It counts as unauthenticated because the attacker only has to get the block markup in front of someone who can open it.

Shortcode Attribute Escapes in Comments

Comment text is filtered at save time against a fourteen-tag allowlist that permits no div and no class attribute. A comment containing no < and no > passes that filter untouched. That is the trick. shortcode_parse_atts() ran stripcslashes() over every attribute value, so \x3c became < long after the comment filter had finished with it.

Getting that to run needs one more thing: a page with a core Latest Comments block. The block renders the comment excerpt inside the_content, where do_blocks runs at priority 9 and do_shortcode at 11, so the post’s own shortcode pass picks up the comment’s text and img_caption_shortcode() prints the result. 7.1.5 changes the decoder so that a hex or octal escape decoding to <, >, " or ' produces a character reference instead. A two-byte escape such as \< is left alone, on the reasoning that it cannot produce a character the raw value did not already contain.

The REST API, Served From an Admin Page

The legacy media library popup calls wp() to run its attachment query, and it hands wp() the entire $_GET array. A rest_route parameter therefore became a query variable on an admin screen, and rest_api_loaded() dispatched the REST API from inside a page that had already sent Content-Type: text/html. The REST response was rendered as HTML. 7.1.5 returns early from rest_api_loaded() whenever WP_ADMIN is defined. That catches every admin screen that funnels request data into wp(), rather than just this one.

Customizer Previews Were Less Sanitized Than Saves

A Customizer option setting is previewed by filtering the option value, which means the preview never passes through the sanitize_option() call that update_option() would have applied on save. The previewed value was therefore less sanitized than the value that would have been stored, which is an unusual shape for a bug and an easy one to miss. 7.1.5 runs previewed option values through sanitize_option() as well, suspending the preview filters while it does so to avoid recursing, and adds a show_on_front case to sanitize_option() that collapses anything other than page to posts. That second part closes the SQL injection: a previewed show_on_front steered $reqpage into a raw interpolation in WP_Query, which this release also wraps in $wpdb->prepare().

The Same Hash for Two Different Things

WP_Customize_Nav_Menus::hash_nav_menu_args() computed wp_hash( serialize( $args ) ), and that hash is the only gate on rendering a nav menu partial with caller-supplied arguments, which reach call_user_func( $args->fallback_cb ). The problem is that the Customizer widgets code computes a hash the same way over its own serialized data, and nothing in the construction separates the two domains. 7.1.5 prefixes the serialized payload with customize_nav_menu_args|. On a single site this changes little, because an administrator can already execute code; on multisite it is the difference between a site Administrator and a Super Admin.

A Date Format That Prints HTML

PHP date format strings pass unrecognised characters through literally, so get_comment_date( $attributes['format'] ) turns the Comment Date block’s format attribute into an arbitrary-HTML primitive. render_block_core_comment_date() printed the result unescaped. It is the one XSS in the release that needs no interaction: the markup renders on the front end for every visitor on page load. 7.1.5 wraps the formatted date in esc_html() on both the linked and the unlinked branch.

A Note on the File List

The version 7.1.5 documentation page lists eighteen revised files and says no package was revised. That is the core PHP backport only. The shipped release also changes wp-includes/blocks/comment-date.php, three bundled JavaScript packages and wp-includes/assets/script-loader-packages.php. Those are the Gutenberg bump, which carries five of the twenty fixes, including the Template Part issue. If you are diffing the release to decide what you are exposed to, diff the packages, not the documented file list.

Timeline

18 November 2026WordPress 7.1.5 released, with backports across every branch still receiving security fixes, through 4.7.
18 November 2026Published vulnerabilities added to the Patchstack Database. No CVE identifiers had been assigned at the time of publication.

Update Now

WordPress 7.1.5 is available from the Dashboard under Updates, or from WordPress.org. Sites with automatic background updates will pick it up on their own. Every branch back to 4.7 has a patched release; branches 4.6 and earlier no longer receive security updates, and nothing in this release changes that.

While you are in the Dashboard, audit who holds Contributor or higher on your sites. Six of these fixes are about what those roles can reach. If you run multisite, look at the Administrator list too: in two of the three highest-scoring issues in this release, a site Administrator is the attacker rather than the victim.

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