Pre-Auth Access Token Manipulation in All-in-One WP Migration Extensions

This blog post is about the All-in-One WP Migration Extensions vulnerability. If you’re an All-in-One WP Migration Extensions user specified below, please update the plugin to the patched version mentioned in this article.

Patchstack Developer and Business users are protected from the vulnerability. You can also sign up for the Patchstack Community plan to be notified about vulnerabilities as soon as they become disclosed.

For plugin developers, we have security audit services and Threat Intelligence Feed API for hosting companies.

About the All-in-One WP Migration Extensions Plugin

The plugin All-in-One WP Migration (free version), which is not vulnerable to this vulnerability but only the listed extensions, is the most popular migration plugin in WordPress which is estimated to be used by over 5 million websites. The plugin also has several premium extensions which allow users to do a migration to a third-party platform such as Box, Google Drive, OneDrive and Dropbox. The plugin itself is developed by ServMask.

This plugin is one of WordPress’s most trusted and utilized plugins for moving websites with absolute ease. It’s intently built with the non-technical user in mind, All-in-One WP Migration comes loaded with newbie-friendly functions that allow us to migrate our WordPress website with little to no technical knowledge or experience.

The security vulnerability

The All-in-One WP Migration Extensions suffers from unauthenticated access token manipulation, which allow any unauthenticated users to update or delete the access token configuration of the affected extension. This access token manipulation could result to a potential sensitive information disclosure of migration to the attacker’s controlled third party account or restore a malicious backup. The vulnerability is assigned CVE-2023-40004. Below are the details on which version the vulnerability is patched on each of the extensions :

• All-in-One WP Migration Box Extension , version 1.54
• All-in-One WP Migration Google Drive Extension , version 2.80
• All-in-One WP Migration OneDrive Extension , version 1.67
• All-in-One WP Migration Dropbox Extension, version 3.76

Unauthenticated Access Token Manipulation

The vulnerable code is pretty identical on all of the 4 affected extensions. The underlying vulnerable code exists in the init function (below is the example code from All-in-One WP Migration Box Extension) :

public function init() {
    if ( isset( $_GET['ai1wmbe_token'] ) ) {
        update_option( 'ai1wmbe_box_token', urldecode( $_GET['ai1wmbe_token'] ) );

        // Redirect to settings page
        wp_redirect( network_admin_url( 'admin.php?page=ai1wmbe_settings' ) );
        exit;
    }

    if ( AI1WMBE_PURCHASE_ID ) {
        update_option( 'ai1wmbe_plugin_key', AI1WMBE_PURCHASE_ID );
    }
}

The code difference from the other 3 extensions is only located on the naming of the ai1wmbe value which differ on each of the affected extensions. Notice that the function itself will update the ai1wmbe_box_token option from the $_GET['ai1wmbe_token'] value. The init function itself is hooked to the WordPress’s admin_init hook which is declared in activate_actions function :

/**
 * Register listeners for actions
 *
 * @return void
 */
private function activate_actions() {
    add_action( 'admin_init', array( $this, 'init' ) );
    add_action( 'admin_init', array( $this, 'router' ) );
    add_action( 'admin_init', array( $this, 'load_textdomain' ) );
    add_action( 'admin_head', array( $this, 'admin_head' ) );
-------------------------- CUTTED HERE --------------------------

The admin_init hook itself could be triggered by unauthenticated user from the /wp-admin/wp-ajax.php endpoint. Since there is no permission and nonce validation on the init function, an unauthenticated is user able to modify or delete the access token used on each of the affected extensions.

The patch

The patch is as simple as adding permission and nonce validation on the init function. Below is an example patch from the All-in-One WP Migration Box Extension:

Conclusion

For plugin and theme developer, keep in mind that the admin_init hook by default can be reached by an unauthenticated user. We recommend applying permission and nonce validation on the function hooked to admin_init if there is sensitive information exported or an action being performed.

Help us make the Internet a safer place

Making the WordPress ecosystem more secure is a team effort, and we believe that plugin developers and security researchers should work together.

• If you’re a plugin developer, join our mVDP program that makes it easier to report, manage and address vulnerabilities in your software.
• If you’re a security researcher, join Patchstack Alliance to report vulnerabilities & earn rewards.